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Community Targeting for Poverty Reduction:  
Lessons from Developing Countries
Moeed Yusuf 
Abstract
This paper analyzes the efficacy of the community-based targeting approach 
as a means of identifying the poor in anti-poverty programs. It examines the 
performance of 30 community-targeted programs in developing countries, 
both in terms of the technique used to identify beneficiaries as well as broader 
targeting “design” issues such as targeting criteria, monitoring, transparency, 
accountability, elite capture, and corruption. This paper is intended to be a 
timely contribution to the ongoing policy debate on poverty targeting in which 
community-based approaches are enjoying growing support.
Community-targeted interventions have tremendous potential to benefit the 
poor; the technique is undoubtedly preferable to universal poverty programs 
whose benefits are thinly spread across the entire population. Moreover, robust, 
program-specific design protocols are seen as critical success-inducing factors; 
monitoring, transparency, and accountability have a strong positive correla-
tion with targeting performance, while elite capture—defined as the ability of 
a handful of individuals to hijack the beneficiary selection or benefit transfer 
process—and corruption are negatively correlated. Further, community targeting 
is better attuned to communities where societal tensions and extreme disparity 
are not a preexisting concern and where there is no known tendency towards 
cultural exclusion based on criteria not linked to poverty levels. On the other 
hand, the technique is not suited to situations where poverty reduction impacts 
are strictly dependent on following stipulated criteria. Communities inevitably 
digress from the criteria, and any effort to check this tendency offsets the potential 
benefit from allowing them to use local knowledge. Community targeting is also 
not recommended for programs where aggregation of poverty data is a high pri-
ority, such as programs that seek to create national or regional poverty rankings. 
The author wishes to thank G. M. Arif, Safdar Parvez, Shanza Khan, Emma Hooper, Nobuo 
Yoshida, and David Coady for their valuable feedback at various stages of  this project, and 
the Pardee Center for editorial support and for managing the publication process.
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INTRODucTION
Poverty reduction is the focus of most developing-country governments 
today, and development experts continue to grapple with the most effective 
means of assisting the poor. There is an increasing consensus that economic 
growth, while necessary, is not sufficient (World Bank 1990, 1997; Coady 
2004). Targeted anti-poverty interventions are now believed to be an essen-
tial element of any poverty-reduction strategy. 
Targeting entails use of policy instruments to identify the poor among a 
population (Weiss 2005, 1). Targeted initiatives strive to maximize “target-
ing efficiency”—the proportion of benefits that reach those identified as 
 “targets”—a feature pivotal to the future of poverty reduction. Inefficiency 
on this count reduces the utility of anti-poverty programs and wastes 
 resources by channeling funds to the non-poor. 
While a number of different methods are available to identify the poor, 
there is growing emphasis on community-based targeting techniques. 
Community targeting is a sub-set of community1 participation, a broader 
concept that applies to all cases where communities lead the decision- 
making process. Existing studies that concur with this view link active par-
ticipation to successful program performance (Bresnyan, Jr., Bouquet, Russo 
[undated], 9). Indeed, a number of donor agencies now make community 
participation a prerequisite for approval of poverty-reduction projects 
(Conning and Kevane 2002, 375). Specifically with regard to targeting, a 
community-led arrangement amounts to decentralization of the targeting 
process such that local knowledge of the relative poverty status among com-
munity members is used to identify program beneficiaries. 
Despite the emphasis on community-based targeting, we know little about 
the efficacy of the technique (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 59). 
Most literature on the subject is based on case studies that only allow 
for tentative generalizations across contexts. This paper seeks to expand 
the current understanding on the subject by analyzing a large number of 
cross-country initiatives. To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale study 
1. We define “community” as a non-government, non-NGO affiliated collective bounded by geographi-
cal proximity.
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focusing specifically on community targeting. The paper is grounded in the 
“institutional approach” (Besley 1997) whereby program performance is 
seen to be affected not only by the “targeting mechanism”, a term we em-
ploy narrowly to refer to the specific technique used to identify beneficiaries, 
but also by broader “design” issues, which encompass all implementation-
related concerns that strike at the heart of governance issues relevant to 
the stipulated mechanism. We seek to identify targeting mechanism- and 
design-related trends across community-targeted interventions in order to 
highlight the key components that lead to success or failure of targeting 
performance. In that sense, the paper moves away from the more frequently 
visited question of welfare impact of poverty alleviation programs. Instead, 
we narrowly focus on determining whether communities are efficient in 
identifying and transferring benefits to the poor. 
The next section highlights conceptual issues related to targeting, and pre-
sents a brief overview of the current literature on community-based initia-
tives. This is followed by a discussion of the methodology of our analysis. 
We then analyze the performance of the selected initiatives and outline 
some broad trends related to targeting mechanisms. The next section deals 
with targeting design, specifically analyzing community behavior in terms of 
implementing targeting criteria, monitoring, transparency, and accountabil-
ity of programs, and the pitfalls common to community-targeted initiatives. 
We end by summarizing the trends and outlining the key strengths and 
weaknesses of community targeting that should be internalized to extract 
maximum utility from future poverty-reduction programs.  
TARgeTINg AND cOmmuNITy-BASeD INITIATIveS:  
cONcePTuAL ISSueS 
The theoretical debate about benefiting the poor has traditionally been 
dictated by two schools of thought. One cohort believes that the best  possible 
way to execute any poverty reduction intervention is by “identifying” those in 
need and then directing the entire resource pool towards them. The oppos-
ing view prefers universal programs that are extended to all, irrespective of the 
level of poverty, but offer benefits that in theory end up benefiting the poor 
disproportionately (Besley and Kanbur 1991, 69; Weiss 2005, 3–6). Over 
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time, universal programs have faded away in favor of targeted interventions 
(World Bank 1990, 1997; Besley and Kanbur 1991, 69–70). The need for 
targeting has become conventional wisdom and the success of anti-poverty 
programs is commonly judged by the accuracy of the targeting approach. 
On paper, the case for targeting is simple. It allows for maximum benefits 
to be directed towards the poor while minimizing expenditure on the non-
poor. In essence, it helps make programs more efficient (Grosh 1994, 8). 
However, this outcome is not easily achieved (World Bank 1990, 4). For 
one, targeting can entail substan-
tial administrative and infor-
mational costs; these are often 
inversely related to the accuracy 
of the targeting methodology 
(Atkinson 1995, 26, 50–60; 
Besley and Kanbur 1991, 75–80; 
Sumarto and Suryahadi 2001, 4). 
Moreover, political economy considerations of balancing the needs of the 
poor and the vested interests of the middle and upper socio-economic 
strata can undermine the theoretical advantage of resource efficiency in 
targeted interventions (Besley and Kanbur 1991, 80–82; Besley 1997; 
Coady 2004).  
A failure to account for these concerns inevitably leads to one of the two 
types of errors associated with targeting. These include the error of under-
coverage or exclusion (type I) where some of the poor are not reached, 
and the error of leakage or inclusion (type II) in which the non-poor—
those outside the target group—receive direct benefits from the program 
 (Weisbrod 1970; Hoddinott 1999). Programs that manage to keep type I 
and type II errors to a minimum while maintaining low targeting costs are 
considered efficient.2 
To ensure maximum gains from targeted programs, a number of targeting 
 approaches are frequently employed (World Bank 2000, 85; Grosh 1994, 
2. Since our focus is targeting efficiency, the analysis in this paper naturally lends itself to a discussion 
of type II errors. Type I errors are most relevant when welfare effects of programs are under scrutiny, an 
aspect which remains beyond the purview of our discussion.
The need for targeting has become 
conventional wisdom and the success 
of anti-poverty programs is commonly 
judged by the accuracy of the targeting 
approach.
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33–35; Weiss 2005, 7–8). These include activity (broad) targeting, direct 
(means) targeting, characteristic targeting, geographical targeting, and self-
targeting.3 Community-based targeting, as defined in this paper, falls under 
the rubric of characteristic targeting. It is unique in that it relies on local 
knowledge about the status of households in the community. Local definitions 
of poverty are more contextualized and can capture community-specific traits 
that centralized proxies often miss (Conning and Kevane 2002, 378). Indeed, 
current research on community involvement in selection of beneficiaries sug-
gests a positive correlation with improved targeting and successful implemen-
tation of development interventions (Subbarao, et al. 1997, 87). 
Proponents argue that community-based targeting is much less likely to 
encounter misinformation. Communities often maintain high social capital 
and societal accountability structures, which entail interactions that reduce 
costs for coordination and collaboration (Spagnolo 1999). Public voice and 
accountability are believed to be naturally attuned to community-based 
approaches. This also implies that design elements such as monitoring 
and accountability entail low costs in the community-targeted technique 
(Mansuri and Rao 2004, 10). Furthermore, even the overall costs of com-
munity targeting are believed to be low. In the most comprehensive large-N 
analysis of targeting programs featuring different techniques, Coady, Grosh, 
and Hoddinott (2004a, 61) conclude that community-based targeting is 
relatively inexpensive.
Just as in the case of targeting, community participation does not guarantee 
gains that it theoretically should each time it is employed. Alderman (2001) 
argues that better community information can only bear dividends if com-
munities find the incentives to reveal and base decisions on that informa-
tion. The single biggest impediment in community participation, one that 
occupies the bulk of the discussion on the method’s efficacy, is elite capture. 
The concern emanates from the heterogeneous nature of communities, as 
the more influential individuals within communities—the elite—often have 
a natural informational advantage and thus can exercise greater leverage 
over the terms of participation in an initiative (Bardhan 2000). Critics of 
community participation see this as common wisdom; they do not take 
3. For a brief explanation of each targeting approach, see Yusuf (2007, 1).
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presence of social capital as a given. They also do not believe that commu-
nity participation can instill a sense of ownership and undermine disparate 
societal power structures (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Spagnolo 1999). 
For these critics, social cohesion is considered a necessary prerequisite for 
community mobilization and efficient targeting returns; its absence im-
plies that the marginalized may not be able to defy local power disparities 
to demand genuine participation. Mansuri and Rao (2004, 20) argue that 
cases exhibiting a net negative benefit from collective action will likely see 
averseness to it. Conceivably, this is most likely in cases where community 
inequality levels are high. Indeed, a number of studies have found inequal-
ity to be positively related to elite capture (La Ferrara 1999; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000).
Related to the above are political economy concerns. Political support for 
programs is often negatively correlated with targeting effectiveness (Sen 
1995). Essentially, political economy compulsions necessitate a certain level 
of tolerance for poorer targeting designs that allow influence of the political 
and social elite as a means of ensuring sustainability of the programs. The 
propensity to accept this “targeting efficiency–sustainability trade-off ” im-
plies that the efficacy of targeting design elements built in as buffers against 
institutional perversions could be compromised.  
meThODOLOgy
This paper presents a meta-analysis of existing assessments of community-
targeted programs. In order to select the sample, we conducted an extensive 
literature review to identify all anti-poverty programs with a community 
component designed to select individual or household level beneficiaries. We 
therefore excluded programs where communities were involved in selecting 
development projects or community groups. Moreover, to be included, the 
program had to have allowed communities to use their subjective knowl-
edge about relative poverty levels among community members. Finally, each 
program had to explicitly aim at identifying the poor (or some subset of the 
poor) through the targeting exercise.  
Our literature review was limited to middle- and low-income countries as 
defined by the World Bank (2008). We exclude high-income countries as 
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their greater resource and institutional capacity often introduces systematic 
differences in performance vis-à-vis the developing world. However, we have 
not restricted our analysis to any particular type of program. The final sample 
includes both cash and in-kind transfer initiatives. Within cash transfer pro-
grams, we have gone against the norm to include programs that offer small-
scale credit as long as they explicitly ask communities to identify beneficiaries 
based on poverty status and not on capacity to repay loans.  
One major determinant of the final sample was availability of requisite 
information. To be useful for the analysis, we required information on the 
targeting performance of programs such that we could categorize them in 
terms of targeting efficiency. Although previous large-scale studies on related 
issues have attempted to rank programs in terms of targeting performance 
(Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 25–26; Grosh 1994, 18, 24–32), the 
nature of the available data in our case would have induced a serious con-
cern about comparability across programs if we had attempted to quantify 
and rank program performance. Therefore, instead of creating an ordinal 
performance scale, we have broadly categorized programs as “progressive,” 
“mildly progressive,” or “regressive” based on their relative performance. 
Given issues of comparability, we refrain from comparing intra-category 
performance, instead conducting the analysis across categories; the differ-
ence in the average performance across categories is large enough that we 
can safely rule out any non-random error induced by this methodology. 
For programs that had sufficient information about the proportion of 
beneficiaries across socio-economic levels, we used a methodology derived 
from Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004a, 25–26) and Grosh (1994, 18, 
24–32). We benchmarked program performance against a hypothetical 
universal program that is “neutral” in its targeting such that each member 
of the population receives an equal share of the benefit.4 Performance is 
measured in terms of either (i) the share of benefits to a particular segment 
of the population representing the poor5 versus the percentage of the total 
4. This is conventional for evaluating targeted anti-poverty interventions. Both studies from which we 
derive our methodology use the same benchmark.
5. One methodological limitation we face stems from the multiple notions of poverty (in terms of who 
qualifies as “poor”) entertained across the reviewed literature. Existing evaluative studies do not provide 
performance data against an identical benchmark. While the majority treats the lowest income quintile 
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population the segment constitutes; or (ii) the share of poor beneficiaries in 
a program versus the percentage of the total population the poor represent.6 
“Progressive” programs are ones where the share of benefits provided to the 
poor or the proportion of poor beneficiaries is more than twice the percent-
age of the total population the poor represent (this amounts to a ratio of 
greater than 2.0). Initiatives where this ratio was between 1.0 and 2.0 are 
considered “mildly progressive.” Finally, programs where the benefits to or 
share of the poor were less than their overall proportion in the population 
(ratio of less than 1.0) were deemed to be “regressive.” 7 
For interventions where available performance information was only 
qualitative in nature, we subjectively determined the relative success, or lack 
thereof, of these programs based on how they were evaluated in the studies 
we examined. Programs for which assessments pointed to successful target-
ing in terms of having transferred an overwhelming majority of the benefits 
to the poor or where all reviews remained highly optimistic were in the 
progressive category. To be considered mildly progressive, there needed to 
be some indication that targeting was better than the “neutral” benchmark. 
However, assessments could have been mixed; they could have pointed to 
considerable leakages to the non-poor in absolute terms. Finally, programs 
where assessments were decidedly negative and suggested that the bulk of 
the benefits went to non-target groups were considered regressive. 
as the cut-off point to examine program performance, some use the bottom two quintiles, the bottom 
half, or country-specific poverty lines. Poorly defined poverty lines induce another source of targeting 
inefficiency. 
  Notwithstanding, as others before us (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a; Grosh 1994), we were 
forced to use the cut-offs provided by the analyzed studies in each case and consider them comparable 
across the board. Again, this is permissible given that we only categorize programs broadly without 
conducting intra-category comparisons. However, the limitation does imply that we treat the “poor” as 
homogenous; we are unable to differentiate between specific segments of the poor.
6. The difference between these two measures is an indicator of welfare implications of differential (as 
opposed to uniform) transfers (Coady and Skoufias 2004). Theoretically, these two are comparable if one 
considers the per capita benefits transferred across beneficiaries to be equal (Grosh 1994, 18). However, 
this is an assumption that may not hold across cases. 
7. To illustrate, say a program transfers 60 percent of the program benefits to the lowest quintile of the 
population, these being the “poor,” the performance ratio would be 60/20=3. On the other hand, if only 
10 percent of the program beneficiaries are from the lowest quintile, the ratio would be 10/20=0.5. The 
methodology would remain the same when calculating the ratio for programs that list the proportion of 
beneficiaries (instead of benefits) in a particular segment of the population. For instance, if 60 percent of 
the beneficiaries are from the lowest quintile, the ratio would still be 60/20=3.
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Overall, we identified 42 programs that fit our criteria. Twelve of these 
were left out of the final analysis due to lack of requisite information. Apart 
from analyzing the targeting mechanisms, each program is evaluated for 
implementation protocols depending on the extent of information avail-
able. Given that the studies examined were of varying quality and focused 
on different aspects of the programs—sometimes even analyses of the same 
variables are not comparable across cases due to definitional issues—not all 
initiatives have been analyzed for the entire breadth of targeting mechanism 
and design issues. Table 1 lists the programs included and the factors against 
which each has been analyzed.
TARgeTINg mechANISm 
Community-based targeting has been employed in programs of various 
types, in combination with different targeting techniques, and in diverse 
geographical settings. Two models for community involvement exist; 14 of 
the 27 programs for which we have the requisite information limit com-
munity roles strictly to identification of beneficiaries, while 13 involve them 
in transferring benefits as well. In order to target individuals, all but three 
programs used selection committees with strong community representa-
tion. The only other method employed—as seen in the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee—CFPR/TUP (BRAC), Pakistan’s National Rural 
Support Program (NRSP), and South Africa’s Tshomisano—is the Poverty 
Wealth Ranking (PWR), a more formal technique that determines relative 
poverty through community-
specified indicators (Robb 1999; 
Gibbons, Simanowitz, and 
Nkuna 1999).8  
Communities are seldom used 
as sole targeting agents in anti-
poverty programs. Twenty-eight 
of the 30 analyzed programs 
8. PWR also relies on community groups to identify the poor. However, unlike committees formed in 
other programs, the PWR technique stipulates a formal guideline on constituting the community groups 
and the method through which they are to identify the poor. Communities are monitored throughout 
and are not allowed any leeway in terms of digressing from the stipulated protocol.
Communities are seldom used as 
sole targeting agents in anti-poverty 
programs. Twenty-eight of the 30 
analyzed programs also employed geo-
graphic, self-targeted, means test, and 
proxy-means test techniques.
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also employed geographic, self-targeted, means test, and proxy-means test 
techniques. Geographic targeting is by far the most frequently used comple-
mentary technique; it was found in 16 of the 30 programs we examined. 
In each case, the geographic tool is used in the first tier to select the areas 
where the program will operate. Communities feature in the subsequent 
tiers; they are responsible for intra-community selection. Self-selection also 
features prominently, with 12 of the 30 programs using this technique in 
the first tier before employing community knowledge to select from among 
the applicants. There are only two programs—Pakistan’s Zakat and Malawi’s 
Targeted Inputs Program (TIP)—that base targeting solely on commu-
nity knowledge. Both programs include the entire population in a defined 
geographical spread as part of the pool from which beneficiaries are to be 
selected, thus making the need for a geographical component redundant. 
Zakat covered Pakistan’s entire population and TIP was spread throughout 
rural Malawi. 
While the combination of targeting techniques makes it virtually impossible 
to isolate the value of the community component completely, this method-
ological complication does not 
confound our analysis since none 
of the 30 analyzed programs satu-
rated the poor population. All 
programs suffered from under-
coverage, thus implying that per-
fect efficiency at the community 
tier should theoretically have led 
to 100 percent targeting towards the poor irrespective of the performance at 
the first tier. Table 2 provides a summary of each of the analyzed programs 
including their relative performance.  
The targeting performance of community-based anti-poverty programs 
shows that simply relying on local community knowledge does not guar-
antee success. Of the 30 programs, 10 cases across seven countries were 
progressive in their targeting, 16 initiatives across nine countries were 
mildly progressive, and four programs across three countries were regressive. 
Further, the correlation between performance and other explanatory factors 
The targeting performance of 
 community-based anti-poverty pro-
grams shows that simply relying on 
local community knowledge does not 
guarantee success.
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that could plausibly impact targeting efficiency—we examined the particu-
lar targeting technique used in a program, the type of program employed, 
and regional and country specific traits—seems weak; none of these factors 
seems to affect community targeting in a systematic manner. 
By itself, the technique used does not explain the targeting performance 
of an intervention. Programs with geographic and community targeting, 
self and community targeting, and a combination of geographic, self, and 
community techniques all show substantial variation in performance. Each 
of these is represented in more than one performance category. Programs 
with a combination of means-testing and community selection are the only 
exceptions as all four incidences produce progressive outcomes. However, 
this result needs to be treated with caution as each of these was a sub-com-
ponent of the same overarching program: Vietnam’s Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty Reduction (HEPR).  
The type of programs, their regional spread, and country characteristics turn 
out to be equally weak proxies for targeting performance. Both cash and in-
kind transfer programs and credit and non-credit programs vary considerably 
in performance, and are found across the entire breadth of the performance 
spectrum. In terms of regional spread, programs in Africa, South Asia, and 
Southeast Asia have highly varied performance. (No meaningful analysis of 
Latin America, Central Asia, or Europe was possible given the small number of 
programs included from these regions.) Programs in South Asian and Southeast 
Asian countries have been progressive, mildly progressive, and regressive; African 
countries feature in the mildly progressive and regressive categories.  
We find no support for previously established evidence that richer countries 
are better placed in terms of targeting outcomes than their poorer coun-
terparts (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 36). Vietnam, Bangladesh, 
and Nepal, all “low-income” countries, managed progressive programs. On 
the other hand, two of the four regressive programs belong to Indonesia, a 
“lower middle” income country (World Bank 2008). Substantial variation 
is even seen in programs within particular countries. Bangladesh, India, 
and Indonesia all have programs in more than one performance category. 
Further, while Vietnam shows relatively low performance variance, this is a 
function of all the interventions being part of the HEPR umbrella program. 
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Table 3 highlights the spread of programs across the performance spectrum 
by targeting technique, program type, and geographic location. 
TARgeTINg DeSIgN
This analysis points to the low explanatory power of the targeting tech-
nique, program type, and geographical location of initiatives in terms of 
explaining targeting performance. Targeting design elements focused on im-
plementational effectiveness constitute the other set of variables that could 
impact targeting performance, and thus may have a more important role in 
explaining the performance of community-targeted interventions (Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 33). In this section, we examine elements of 
targeting design—namely monitoring, transparency, and accountability—
and assess their impact on commonly feared institutional perversions, such 
as elite capture and corruption. 
One key question is whether the variability in targeting efficiency is caused 
by the behavior of selection committees. Do communities choose to ignore 
targeting objectives in some cases? Does this result in poorer performance? 
Moreover, what role do monitoring, accountability, and transparency proto-
cols play in outcomes? Do programs that exhibit good governance manage 
to extract better behavior from community groups in charge of selection? 
And how are these related to the incidence of elite capture and corruption? 
By answering these questions, we hope to establish whether targeting design 
elements have high explanatory power in terms of overall targeting perfor-
mance. We begin by highlighting the relationship among various design 
elements and between these and overall program performance. Next, we 
contextualize the analysis by undertaking a detailed qualitative discussion of 
each of the design elements. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to put targeting performance in 
perspective. Thus far, we have posited progressive programs as successful, 
mildly progressive programs as less so, and regressive ones as unsuccess-
ful. While this is true relative to the benchmark of a “neutral” universal 
program, it does not imply that the successful programs are free from 
institutional anomalies; even successful programs could have substantially 
high leakages. In fact, each of the progressive programs evaluated allows 
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Table 3: Spread of Programs across the Performance Spectrum 
Total 
Incidence
Progressive mildly 
Progressive
Regressive
By targeting technique
Geographic and community* 9 1 6 2
Self-targeted and community 5 3 1 1
Geographic, self-targeted, 
and community 
5 0 4 1
Means-test and community 
(with or without self-
selection) 
4 4 0 0
By program type **
Cash transfer 23 5 14 4
   Non-credit 15 4 9 2
   Credit 8 1 5 2
In-kind transfer 15 6 7 2
   Food/Farm input 9 2 5 2
   Social services 6 4 2 0
Total 38 11 21 6
Regional distribution 
South Asia 11 3 7 1
South East Asia 9 5 2 2
Africa 5 0 4 1
Total 25 8 13 4
By Country
Bangladesh 4 1 3 0
India 4 1 2 1
Indonesia 4 0 2 2
Vietnam 4 4 0 0
* “Community” does not include programs that conducted a PWR exercise. PWR was treated separately 
and is excluded from the table given its low incidence among the analyzed programs. 
** Total is greater than the number of analyzed programs as some programs offered both cash and in-
kind benefits, and in some cases, the same program offered credit and non-credit benefits.
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populations in the top four quintiles to receive between 40 and 50 percent 
of the benefits. The leakages are staggeringly high for programs in the lower 
performance categories. For instance, India’s Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Program (IRDP), a mildly progressive program, included 15 to 26 
percent of recipients above the poverty line; in some regions the proportion 
of ineligible beneficiaries was 40 to 50 percent (Chavan and Ramakumar 
2002, 957). Similarly, for Bangladesh’s Food for Education (FFE) program, 
also a mildly progressive initiative, 35 percent of the beneficiaries were from 
the richest two quintiles (Ahmed and Ninno 2002, 23). In essence, even 
though programs may seem successful against our benchmark, they can still 
have substantial type II errors. Notwithstanding, if design issues are posi-
tively related to program performance, we should expect better performing 
programs to have fewer perversions in terms of implementation.  
LINkINg eLemeNTS OF DeSIgN  
TO TARgeTINg eFFIcIeNcy
A strong trend between functional9 design elements and positive performance 
is easily discernable. All 10 progressive programs managed a robust program-
specific or overarching monitoring 
protocol. On the other hand, less 
than half of the mildly progressive 
programs and none of the regressive 
programs exhibited effective moni-
toring. The pattern is the same in 
terms of transparency. Two-thirds of 
the evaluated programs instituted a 
properly functioning mechanism to 
apprise communities of the program and its benefits and/or employed transpar-
ent disbursement criteria. None of the remaining, non-transparent programs 
were progressive. Further, transparency, monitoring, and accountability are per-
fectly correlated. Each program that instituted some mechanism for monitoring 
also had properly functional transparency and accountability protocols. 
9. In this section, we are concerned with the functionality, not mere stipulation of design protocols. 
Therefore, we consider design elements to be “absent” in programs where they were not implemented 
effectively in practice, irrespective of whether they were stipulated on paper. 
Further, transparency, monitoring, and 
accountability are perfectly correlated. 
Each program that instituted some 
mechanism for monitoring also had 
properly functional transparency and 
accountability protocols.
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The link between these governance-enhancing protocols and institutional 
perversions is also evident. Monitoring, transparency, and accountability 
are inversely related to elite capture. In absolute terms, the incidence of 
elite capture—defined as the ability of a handful of individuals to hijack the 
beneficiary selection or benefit transfer process—is relatively low; it fea-
tures in seven of the 25 programs evaluated on this count. None of these is 
progressive; only Bangladesh’s Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) and 
FFE initiatives suffered from elite capture despite instituting monitoring, 
transparency, and accountability protocols successfully. On the other hand, 
failure to employ functional design protocols leads to elite capture in every 
case. That said, the propensity of the elite to hijack the program is not syn-
onymous with discretion. At least 11 of the 25 evaluated programs allowed 
some level of discretion in selection to an individual—these were mostly 
local officials, village chiefs, or heads of the selection committees—but this 
only translated into elite capture in three instances. Moreover, discretion is 
not a necessary precondition for elite capture; at least three programs were 
hijacked by the elite despite absence of any provision to allow discretion.  
Incidentally, elite capture and corruption are perfectly correlated, and like 
elite capture, occurrence of corruption is inversely related to design protocols. 
Out of the 22 programs evaluated for corruption, six reported corruption as 
a major concern but only two—Bangladesh’s FFE and VGD programs—pos-
sessed functional monitoring, transparency, and accountability protocols. 
Table 4 highlights the presence, or lack thereof, of various design elements 
across the analyzed programs. 
In essence, while none of the governance-strengthening protocols seems to 
be a sufficient condition for successful performance, the general pattern sug-
gests a strong negative correlation between initiatives with positive design 
attributes and institutional perversions. Moreover, the fact that monitoring, 
transparency, and accountability are strongly correlated with each other 
suggests that, for the most part, programs either manage to institute robust, 
overarching targeting designs or fail to do so completely; the latter raises 
the likelihood of both elite capture and corruption and, in turn, relatively 
poorer program performance. Figure 1 captures the link between monitor-
ing, transparency, and accountability and elite capture and corruption. 
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Table 4: Targeting Design Across Programs
country Program monitoring Transparency Accountability elite 
capture 
Discretion corruption 
Progressive Programs
Albania Ndihme Ekonomika Present Present Present * Present Absent
Bangladesh Rural Maintenance 
Program
* Present * * * Absent
Chile School Feeding 
Program
Present Present Present Absent Present Absent
India National Old Age 
Pension Scheme
* Present * Absent Absent Absent
Nepal Churia Food for 
Work
Present Present Present Absent Present Absent
Thailand Social Investment 
Fund—Menu 5
Present * Present Absent Absent Absent
Vietnam Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty 
Reduction (Credit)
Present Present 1 Present 1 Absent Present Absent
Vietnam Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty 
Reduction Low 
(Certificates)
Present Present 1 Present 1 Absent Absent Absent
Vietnam Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty 
Reduction (Health 
Insurance)
Present Present 1 Present 1 Absent Absent Absent
Vietnam Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty 
Reduction 
(Education)
Present Present 1 Present 1 Absent Absent Absent
mildly Progressive Programs 
Bangladesh Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement 
Committee—CFPR/
TUP
Present * Present Absent Absent Absent
Bangladesh Food for Education Present Present Present Present Absent Present
Bangladesh Vulnerable Group 
Development
Present Present Present Present Absent Present
Brazil North East Rural 
Poverty Alleviation 
Program
Present Present Present Absent Absent *
Ethiopia Emergency Food Aid * Absent * Present Absent *
India Indira Awas Yojana Absent * Absent Present * Present
India Integrated Rural 
Development 
Program
Absent Absent Absent * * Present
Indonesia JPS Scholarship 
Program
Present Present Present Absent Absent Absent
Indonesia Operasi Pasar 
Khusus-Raskin
Present Present * Absent Present *
Malawi Targeted Inputs 
Program
Absent Absent Absent Present Present *
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country Program monitoring Transparency Accountability elite 
capture 
Discretion corruption 
Pakistan National Rural 
Support Program
Present Present Present Absent Absent Absent
Pakistan Zakat Absent Absent Absent Present Present Present 
South 
Africa
Public Works 
Program—101 
Projects
* * * Absent Present Absent
South 
Africa
Tshomisano 
Program
Present * Present Absent Absent Absent
Uzbekistan Social Assistance 
Program
(Child Allowance)
Present Absent 2 Absent 2 Absent Present *
Uzbekistan Social Assistance 
Program 
(Low Income)
Present Absent 2 Absent 2 Absent Present *
Regressive Programs
India Sampoorna 
Grameen Rozgar 
Yojana
Absent Absent Absent Present Present Present
Indonesia Inpres Desa 
Tertingga
Absent * * * * *
Indonesia Pemberdayaan 
Daerah Dalam 
Mengatasi Dampak 
Krisis Ekonomi
Absent * * * * *
Zimbabwe Child Supplementary 
Feeding Program
Absent Absent * Absent Absent Absent
* Information not available
1 Transparency and Accountability are not program specific; rather, they are built into the societal norm.
2 The Mahallas that are responsible for targeting are institutionalized setups but do not have oversight 
or transparency. Yet, Mahallah heads are well-respected and are under a social obligation to act in the 
community’s interest.
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Figure 1: Design elements and Institutional Perversions 
cONTexTuALIzINg DeSIgN ISSueS 
Having underscored the importance of strong targeting design, we now 
move on to highlight how the design-related protocols were instituted across 
programs (also see Appendix 1). This is essential since none of the design 
elements are uniform in their application and it is entirely plausible that 
some forms are more suited to particular contexts. A nuanced view is neces-
sary if we are to identify targeting designs that are most likely to succeed if 
replicated.   
Official Program criteria and community Flexibility. A consistent trait in 
community-targeted programs is the propensity of the communities asked 
to select beneficiaries to diverge from the stipulated program criteria. The 
tendency was seen in programs across the performance spectrum; there 
seems to be no correlation between performance and adherence to the pro-
gram criteria. Virtually all analyzed programs exhibited “delegation”—not 
“devolution”—in that none handed over total responsibility for all aspects 
of targeting to communities (Conning and Kevane 2002, 381). Instead, 
communities were given criteria on which to base the selection process. 
Flexibility was permissible—its extent varied considerably—but only within 
the bounds of the criteria. We find that communities consistently mold, if 
Transparency
Monitoring
Accountability
Minimize elite 
capture
Minimize 
corruption
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not completely ignore, stipulated targeting indicators to identify the benefi-
ciaries. In as many as 19 of the 26 programs that stipulated criteria, commu-
nities either disregarded it entirely or followed it only loosely (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Flexibility Beyond Stipulated criteria
The following discussion focuses on two specific aspects of community 
behavior regarding: 
 (i)   criteria stipulating greater weight to specific indicators of poverty as 
the basis for selection; and 
 (ii)   criteria for the total number of beneficiaries (or the total benefit 
allocation). 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the tendency of communities to move 
away from stipulated criteria is a negative attribute. The presupposition is 
that the criteria laid out by program conceivers are based on calculations 
that seek to optimize the outcomes in terms of achieving their broader 
poverty reduction goals. However, in the analyzed cases, flexibility in the 
use of program criteria does not necessarily produce poorer results. Instead, 
we find support for the view that centralized impressions of poverty are 
unable to capture the differences in profiles of the poor across communities. 
In Vietnam, local community discretion produces improved outcomes over 
income-based means tests stipulated by the government (Nguyen and Rama 
2007, 18). Similarly, in Bangladesh’s FFE program, while the community 
selected 21.3 percent households that did not meet the official eligibility cri-
teria, 57 percent of these had incomes lower than beneficiaries who satisfied 
the criteria (Ahmed and Ninno 2002, 25). On the other hand, Clay, Molla, 
Flexibility
Present Absent
Progressive Programs 8 2
mildly Progressive Programs 7 9
Regressive Programs 4 0
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and Habtewold (1999, 401–02) partly blame poor targeting performance 
in Ethiopia’s Emergency Food Aid (EFA) program on the official selection 
criteria; the recommended indicators—households with aged or female 
heads—turned out to be weak proxies for poverty in some program areas. 
The potential for improved targeting notwithstanding, community flexibil-
ity in selection of indicators makes it impossible to aggregate poverty counts 
across communities. Community-based poverty evaluations are known 
to suffer from aggregation problems, an attribute that makes the task of 
developing overarching anti-poverty strategies using community-targeting 
difficult. In fact, this is the reason that program initiators stipulate proxies 
for selection in the first place (Yusuf 2007; Simanowitz, 1999). However, 
the stipulation seems to have little effect. Therefore, the best case scenario—
this is applicable to programs where flexibility in using stipulated criteria 
enhances targeting performance—entails a “targeting efficiency–cross-
community comparability trade-off.”  On the other hand, initiatives where 
flexibility is not correlated with improved targeting performance present an 
even more unattractive prospect of having to forego aggregation without 
gaining on the targeting count. 
The second aspect where communities tend to ignore stipulated criteria 
deals with the level of benefit transfers. A number of programs—again 
spanning the breadth of the performance spectrum—that tasked communi-
ties to transfer benefits or determine the amount of per capita benefit saw 
them frequently spread transfers across a higher-than-stipulated number of 
beneficiaries. In some cases, the poverty reduction rationale of programs was 
completely ignored. In Indonesia’s Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK)-Raskin, for 
example, some villages adopted a first-come, first-serve approach regardless 
of the beneficiaries’ poverty level (Perdana and Maxwell 2004, 27). Others 
divided the villages’ quotas equally among all members (Coady, Grosh, and 
Hoddinott 2004a, 61). In South Africa’s Public Works Program (PWP) and 
Bangladesh’s Rural Maintenance Program (RMP), the communities were 
viewed as egalitarian, leading to a process that selected beneficiaries through 
a lottery among all applicants (Adato and Haddad 2002, 25; Robinson 
2006, 7). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, pressure to distribute food among 
all children led to the per capita benefit dropping from the stipulated 10 
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kilograms per person per month to a mere five kilograms (Kaseke, Dhemba, 
and Gumbo 1997, 28). 
The desire for a wider-than-permissible transfer of program benefits strikes 
at the heart of the social capital debate, given that this is often a conse-
quence of concern for intra-community harmony. In OPK-Raskin, commu-
nities implementing the first-come, first-serve approach were under threat 
of communal conflict (Perdana and Maxwell 2004, 28). In Malawi, another 
program that saw thin disper-
sion in some villages, areas that 
refrained from this practice saw 
targeting-related violence. More-
over, those who were left out of 
the program refused to assist in 
other community development 
works (Chinsinga, et al. 2002, 
50–51). In the same vein, South 
Africa’s trade unions opposed community participation in the targeting of 
PWP, citing a correlation between community involvement and conflict 
(Adato and Haddad 2002, 28–29). The thinly spread benefits in Zimbabwe 
were also a result of the social norm, which opposed selective distribution; 
Chitekwe (undated) found conflict among beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
neighbors in the program area.  
The trade-off between positive social capital and poverty reduction should 
be evident. Community-based targeting seems to confront a moral hazard 
problem whereby what communities consider fair and based on true de-
servingness actually constitutes mis-targeting from the perspective of those 
conceiving the programs (Conning and Kevane 2002, 381). Presuming that 
the stipulated criteria are optimal in terms of achieving poverty reduction 
targets, the leakage or reduced per capita transfer to the poor caused by thin 
distribution is counterproductive: it is likely to have adverse incentive effects 
on labor supply and savings of beneficiaries, and in turn on efficiency and 
growth objectives (Ravallion 2003, 3). This runs counter to the view of pro-
ponents of community participation who see social capital as complement-
ing overarching anti-poverty goals.
The desire for a wider-than-permis-
sible transfer of program benefits 
strikes at the heart of the social capital 
debate, given that this is often a conse-
quence of concern for intra-community 
harmony.
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There is yet another troubling tendency related to the “social capital– 
poverty reduction trade-off ” in community-based programs: the propen-
sity of selection committees to deliberately ignore certain segments of the 
community based on social dynamics unrelated to poverty. In Uzbekistan 
for instance, the Mahallas10 are attuned to Islamic ethics and are less popular 
with non-Central Asian, Slavic civilizations. Their outlook biases targeting 
practices (Coudouel, Marnie, and Micklewright 1998, 4, 24). Similarly, in 
Vietnam decisions by village chiefs tend to leave out unregistered migrants, 
people with socially unacceptable behavior, and those not considered to be 
working hard enough (Nguyen and Rama 2007, 9–10; World Bank 2003, 
83). The South African PWP witnessed strong resistance among recipient 
communities on the question of selecting women for employment in the 
construction sector, a program stipulation that went against the established 
norm (Adato and Haddad 2002, 29). 
monitoring of Programs. The evaluated programs used a wide variety of 
monitoring approaches. An overwhelming majority of public programs 
retain the monitoring role for government officials; for non-governmen-
tal initiatives, program staff tend to monitor programs. Out of the 22 
programs analyzed on this count, only seven left communities in charge 
of monitoring without employing any additional layer of monitors. 
However, five of these—the four sub-components of the Vietnamese 
HEPR and the Thai Social Investment Fund (SIF)—are set in contexts 
where a strong, overarching monitoring and accountability mechanism 
exists courtesy of societal norms (World Bank 2003, 125; Satterthwaite 
2004).11 The other two programs—the Indonesian Inpres Desa Ter-
tingga (IDT) and Pemberdayaan Daerah Dalam Mengatasi Dampak 
Krisis Ekonomi (PDM-DKE)—lacked any such norms; we found both 
to have regressive outcomes. 
10. Mahallas are traditional, community-based social institutions and have existed in Uzbekistan for centu-
ries. They allow for community participation and remain central to daily life, especially in the rural areas. 
11. In Vietnam, a grass roots democracy initiative is in place. The role of the village chiefs remains cen-
tral to the initiative. In the same vein, Thailand has a dedicated functionary, the Community Organiza-
tions Development Institute, set up in order to enhance community networking through Community 
Organization Networks. 
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A number of programs institute multi-tiered monitoring. While multi-
tiered monitoring was not limited to successful programs,12 studies assessed 
such frameworks to be beneficial for targeting performance whenever they 
functioned efficiently. Arguably the most robust monitoring structure fea-
tured is Albania’s Ndhime Ekonomika, where triangulation and redundancy 
were intrinsic to the protocol: at least two independent government func-
tionaries were asked to monitor the program in addition to the community 
and monitoring was dynamic, mandating regular updates of beneficiary lists 
(Kolpeja 2005a). Other programs that combined community and govern-
ment roles in a multi-tiered monitoring framework include the Chilean 
School Feeding Program and the Bangladeshi FFE (Kain, Uauy, and Taibo 
2002, 600–601; Ahmed and Ninno 2002, 9–11). The Brazilian North East 
Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (RPAP) left monitoring primarily to the 
state authorities but retained an active role for the donor agency, the World 
Bank, which evaluated monthly progress reports generated by the govern-
ment (Quinn 1998). The Indonesian JPS scholarship program used another 
approach that positively affected targeting; a donor-funded initiative em-
ployed independent monitors through the Central Independent Monitoring 
Unit (CIMU), which collected data regularly to analyze program perfor-
mance (Baines 2005, 39–41, 105). The above notwithstanding, as Baines 
(2005, 105) points out, independent monitoring is often criticized for being 
an expensive exercise and thus not feasible for non-donor funded programs. 
All three NGO-run programs—the South African Tshomisano, the Ban-
gladeshi BRAC, and Pakistani NRSP—included extensive monitoring of 
the identification processes (Simanowitz 1999; Gibbons, Simanowitz, and 
Nkuna 1999, 39–62). However, this was partly a function of the PWR 
technique, which has a built-in monitoring mechanism for beneficiary 
selection, requiring program staff to monitor the entire process. The most 
elaborate protocol was followed by the Tshomisano Program where trian-
gulation of results was ensured by using three to four reference groups to 
12. An example where the system did not work is Zimbabwe’s Child Supplementary Feeding Program. 
In this case, government-appointed District Nutrition Coordinators were deployed in insufficient 
numbers and were thus unable to perform their task efficiently. Another serious constraint that made 
monitoring virtually impossible was the absence of data on the number of beneficiaries and amount of 
transfers (Kaseke, Dhemba, and Gumbo 1997, 37).
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rank each household separately before tallying the results (Simanowitz 1999; 
Simanowitz 2000).  
Perhaps most important from the point of view of program designers is 
the fact that, irrespective of the monitoring technique and program perfor-
mance, monitoring across programs was restricted to overseeing anomalies 
that surfaced despite the commu-
nity’s opposition to them. There 
is no evidence in any program 
of monitors challenging aspects 
on which community consensus 
existed. Therefore, the use of 
flexibility beyond the stipulated 
program criteria continued ir-
respective of the strength of the 
monitoring protocol. In fact, in 
extreme cases such as Vietnam’s, communities were even allowed to ignore 
the condition of conducting a means test altogether in favor of local knowl-
edge (Nguyen and Rama 2007, 9).  
Incidence of flexibility despite monitoring hints at two possibilities. First, 
specifically in terms of criteria for selection, authorities may have realized 
the value of deferring to local knowledge given that centralized poverty 
estimates do not always capture context-specific poverty profiles. Second, 
the political economy of targeted programs also seems to have weighed in. 
Anti-poverty programs are often sold by politicians as a major achievement 
on their part. Therefore, it is only natural for them to shy away from creat-
ing resentment within the community; this would amount to a reversal of 
any good will they have generated by portraying the program as an outcome 
of their efforts. Given that implementing program criteria, especially in 
terms of per capita disbursement, could lead to intra-community tensions, it 
would be politically damaging for elected representatives to force adherence. 
Transparency. Transparency in targeted programs is primarily required at 
three steps: (i) while apprising communities of the program and benefits; 
(ii) when ensuring that those in charge of selection understand the identifi-
cation criteria; and (iii) during disbursement of benefits. 
Monitoring across programs was 
restricted to overseeing anomalies that 
surfaced despite the community’s op-
position to them. There is no evidence 
in any program of monitors challenging 
aspects on which community consen-
sus existed.
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Public education campaigns about a program’s features were the most 
popular component of information dissemination. Indonesia’s JPS scholar-
ship program undertook a major media campaign to raise awareness among 
communities (Baines 2005, 39–40). An effort to publicize the OPK-Raskin 
scheme was also undertaken (Sumarto and Suryahadi 2001, 18). In  Brazil’s 
RPAP, communities were apprised of the means to benefit from the pro-
grams through information campaigns (Quinn 1998). In Bangladesh’s 
VGD, while no information dissemination protocol was mandated, the 
BRAC NGO staff, which was involved with VGD communities, apprised 
locals about the program and their entitlements (Hossain 2007). 
Programs in Vietnam suggest that established mechanisms that favor trans-
parency may reduce the need for program-specific protocols to the same 
 effect. For instance, “village chiefs” in Vietnam already internalize information 
dissemination as a societal norm (World Bank 2003, 83, 113–14). Therefore, 
despite the fact that no Vietnamese program instituted a program-specific 
transparency mechanism, the established community-level protocols seem 
to have buffered against elite capture and corruption. 
Next, programs applying PWR conducted a detailed briefing of the com-
munities to inform them of the program, the PWR technique, and potential 
program benefits (Simanowitz 1999; Matin and Halder 2004, 6–9; Yusuf 
2007). Again, such transparency is built into PWR’s formal methodology. 
That said, BRAC’s experience throws up a dilemma in terms of provid-
ing ex ante information about program benefits. Communities tended to 
find the PWR exercise cumbersome, and most only joined reluctantly. In 
Bangladesh, a study conducted by BRAC (2004) points to high community 
disinterest despite repeated requests to participate in PWR. This suggests 
that for programs employing PWR, it may be prudent to carefully balance 
between questions of social science research and project implementation 
ethics, thereby withholding information that may lead communities to 
become disinterested in the exercise (Hoddinott 1999, 20). 
In terms of apprising selection committees about program objectives and 
selection criteria, the data exhibits a strong link between transparency and 
complexity of selection design. Complexity can be a result of complicated 
documents that are to be evaluated according to set criteria, as was the case 
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with self-targeted programs like the IRDP and National Old Age Pension 
Scheme (NOAPS) in India, Ndhime Ekonomika in Albania, and Zakat in 
Pakistan (Srivastava 2004, 25, 30; 
Alderman 2001; Government of 
Pakistan 2006b). Alternatively, 
programs could include multiple 
targeting tiers that community 
selectors need to be informed 
about. There could also be 
specific groups of marginalized 
within the poor to whom programs’ conceivers wish to allocate a dispropor-
tionately high level of benefit. Training or briefing communities becomes 
important as there are often no pre-established communication channels 
between program conceivers and communities. Moreover, unless advised, 
communities have little knowledge of what is expected of them (Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 61). 
Overall, 12 out of the 30 programs can be characterized as having complex 
selection requirements or program criteria. Five of these, the progressive 
NOAPS, the mildly progressive Zakat and TIP, and the regressive PDM-
DKE and CSFP, lacked a training component. Three others, while missing 
program-specific performance, relied on pre-existing capacity among com-
munities courtesy of institutionalized structures regularly tasked to perform 
such functions. This was the case in Vietnam, Thailand, and Uzbekistan.13 
Indonesia’s JPS scholarship program had the most elaborate training and 
socialization component: it used independent monitors and master train-
ers to assist community groups (Baines 2005, 80–81). Chile combined the 
two traits, whereby school teachers conducted census exercises periodically 
even before the School Feeding Program but were also trained specifically to 
identify the health problems that would make children eligible for program 
13. The village chiefs in Vietnam are mandated to maintain up-to-date knowledge about community 
members and are called upon to take the lead in all community-led initiatives. The Thai Community 
Organizations are also part of all programs that involve community participation. By the same token, the 
Uzbek Mahallas are instituted in the country’s governance structure by law and remain central to com-
munity issues. All three benefit from institutional memory in terms of conducting tasks such as targeting 
and program implementation. 
Training or briefing communities 
becomes important as there are often 
no pre-established communication 
channels between program conceivers 
and communities.
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benefits (Kain, Uauy, and Taibo 2002, 602). To the contrary, the three cases 
where lack of training seems to have affected performance adversely are 
Indonesia’s PDM-DKE, Malawi’s TIP, and Zimbabwe’s Child Supplemen-
tary Feeding Program (CSFP). Malawi’s case was extreme in that even the 
selection committees—the Village Task Forces (VTFs)—were not formed in 
one fourth of the villages included in a survey conducted by Chinsinga, et 
al. (2002, 32). In Zimbabwe, lack of proper training resulted in poor data 
records and incorrect preparation of food packets (Kaseke, Dhemba, and 
Gumbo 1997, 37; Walker and Ncube 1997, 14; Munro 2002, 248).  
Finally, in terms of disbursement, programs that featured transparency 
either mandated public distribution or sought to reduce human contact in 
benefit transfer. Distribution through checks deposited directly in ben-
eficiary bank accounts in lieu of cash seems to have reduced incidence 
of misappropriation in India’s NOAPS (Srivastava 2004, 30). Another 
mechanism adopted by programs such as the Albanian Ndhime Ekonomika 
and Indonesian JPS scholarship programs disbursed money through post 
offices—the postal service was regarded as relatively honest—rather than 
local program facilities (Kolpeja 2005; Baines 2005, 38). Apart from that, 
programs such as NOAPS transferred cash in public,14 while Nepal’s Churia 
and Bangladesh’s FFE mandated grain distribution in the presence of com-
munities (Meagher, Upadhyaya, and Wilkinson 1999, 19–20; Ahmed and 
Nonno 2002, 11). Assessments of these programs do not report any concern 
about misappropriation during disbursement of benefits. 
Accountability. Of the 21 programs analyzed for accountability, 14 exhib-
ited a functional protocol. Unlike monitoring and transparency, however, 
no accountability protocol was left to the community. Each program that 
featured a system of accountability required a party detached from ben-
eficiary selection or benefit transfer to manage the protocol. Administra-
tive  accountability mechanisms were most frequently adopted. Albania’s 
Ndhime Ekonomika allowed any household or government-appointed pro-
gram inspector to contest the selection decision of the committees (Kolpeja 
2005b). Contestation was to be taken up by the regional offices in charge 
14. NOAPS provisions for both options, i.e., distributing cash in public or transferring benefits directly 
to recipient bank accounts.
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of the program. Vietnam’s HEPR tasked a civil servant in charge of social 
issues in the Peoples’ Committee to review and act upon all contested cases 
(World Bank 2003, 114). BRAC and NRSP allowed  direct complaints 
against PWR group members to the field staff or to the senior program staff 
in regional offices (Yusuf 2007). 
Indonesia’s JPS scholarship program used the dedicated CIMU. The Unit 
actively pursued cases of misappropriation; it seems to have acted as a deter-
rent as only 12 cases of petty corruption were brought to its notice in the 
first six years of the program—a significant achievement for a country that 
is otherwise ranked in the bottom half of global corruption indices (Baines 
2005, 96, 115–118).  
Two programs relied heavily on public accountability. Nepal’s Churia, a 
progressive program, apart from conducting regular audits and displaying 
all information in the public domain, exposed cases of misappropriation to 
shame culprits in large community gatherings and forced them to cover the 
shortfall in benefits before the next tranche could be released to the com-
munities (Meagher, Upadhyaya, and Wilkinson 1999, 18–20). Interestingly, 
while Nepal has traditionally suffered from chronic institutional perver-
sions in anti-poverty programs and has poor accountability indicators,15 the 
Churia program successfully isolated the initiative from the broader con-
text by developing a sense of community ownership and creating a system 
that made a good reputation an imperative for beneficiaries to continue 
taking advantage of the program (Meagher, Upadhyaya, and Wilkinson 
1999, 1–9). The Thai SIF targeted accountability towards the community 
networks responsible for benefit allocation and disbursement. It relied on 
public announcements as a means to deter excesses. A website was also used 
to post developments, including any instances of misappropriation (Salim 
2001). This mechanism succeeded because community networks are a 
permanent feature of the Thai civil society and thus they are very concerned 
about their reputation.
15. In the most elaborate and recent compilation of global governance indices, Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2008) rank Nepal’s “Voice and Accountability” environment at 170th out of the 212 
 countries in the world.
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elite capture and corruption: Elite capture is a concern that all community-
centered initiatives have to grapple with. Keeping the elite out of the targeting 
process is unrealistic (Wade 1987). Often, the elite are the only cohort who 
can comprehend program objectives and bring community groups together to 
implement initiatives (Bardhan 2000). Elite capture can take place both at the 
behest of the community influentials as well as without their concurrence. 
Among the analyzed programs, the most non-transparent ones saw com-
munities themselves being involved in manipulating the process. In some 
villages in Malawi’s TIP, the VTFs designated to select beneficiaries deliber-
ately kept the larger community out of the information loop and changed 
the beneficiary lists after selection at the whims of the village heads. VTF 
members even self-selected themselves regularly (Chinsinga, et al. 2002, 33–
34, 46). Pakistan’s Zakat is another program where the Local Zakat Com-
mittees (LZCs) collude with social and political elite to misdirect benefits 
deliberately. According to Arif (2006, 37), 42 percent of the beneficiaries are 
recommended by local landlords, elite, and religious leaders, or are relatives 
of the members of the LZCs. Indonesia’s PDM-DKE also saw community 
selection committees restricting access to the decision-making process for 
the broader community (Perdana and Maxwell 2004, 23–24). 
One major factor in avoiding elite capture, especially in programs that 
accorded discretion, was the personalities of those in charge of selection. 
Perdana and Maxwell (2004, 28) argue that in Indonesia’s OPK-Raskin, 
targeting performance was best in villages where local personnel were honest 
and understood the ultimate objectives of the program. Similarly, in Paki-
stan’s NRSP, anecdotal evidence recorded by the author (Yusuf 2007) found 
the charismatic personality of the community organization leader to be 
positively related to the success of the initiative. In Vietnam, the village chiefs 
are well respected and under a social obligation to act in the community’s 
interest (World Bank 2003, 125–26).16 This is also the case with Uzbekistan’s 
Mahallas. Mahallah heads have considerable discretion but are not found 
to be colluding with the elite (Sievers 2002, 153; Coudouel, Marnie, and 
 Micklewright 1998). 
16. The village chiefs in Vietnam were not accorded any discretion except in HEPR’s “Credit” program. 
In the other three sub-components, decision making was highly democratic. 
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The other set of programs that experienced elite capture were hijacked 
despite—not because of—communities. In India’s Sampoorna Grameen 
Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), all projects selected under the program were decided 
by the political elite in line with the preference of contractors. Elite simply 
forced Gram Sabhas17—these are also established institutions but did not 
manage to keep the elite at bay—to announce their selected projects and 
beneficiaries during the meetings to fulfill the formality. The elite even man-
aged to have Gram Sabha-based selection abandoned in the second phase of 
the program. The social caste system contributed to mis-targeting, with the 
scheduled castes facing discrimination in beneficiary selection (Deshingkar, 
Johnson, and Farrington 2005, 580–85). India’s Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) 
also suffered from elite capture whereby local politicians used beneficiary 
selection and benefit distribution as a means of patronage, thus favoring 
their constituencies. Even then, beneficiaries had to bribe officials to receive 
their entitlements (Srivastava 2004, 28–29). In Bangladesh’s VGD program, 
Ninno (2001) found that the selection committee was involved in iden-
tification in only 69 percent of the sample cases. There was also evidence 
of political patronage. The local-level Union Parishad18 officials retained 
household VGD cards against the stipulated protocol in order to keep 
communities indebted to them for the transfer of benefits (Hossain 2007, 
15). Women in VGD communities reinforced the patronage potential by 
lobbying aggressively with the politicians to encourage selection committees 
to include their names (Hossain 2007, 15). 
The analysis hints at a relationship between social disparity and elite 
capture. While we have been unable to formally test this relationship, 
social hierarchies do seem to play a role. Indian programs are notorious for 
exhibiting community behavior that suggests their helplessness in the face 
of excesses committed by the elite. A classic example was the SGRY where 
extensive corruption and nepotism led communities to seek assistance by 
making phone calls to the local police. However, the influentials simply had 
the community’s phone access cut off prior to any planned large-scale sale of 
rice (contractors paid employees in cash and sold the rice at a higher price in 
17. Gram Sabhas are village-level community groups, widespread throughout India, designed to ensure 
community involvement in decisions that affect their development.
18. Union Parishad is an administrative unit roughly comprising 15 villages.
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the market) originally intended to reach the beneficiaries (Deshingkar, John-
son, and Farrington 2005, 586). Similarly, using inequality and profession 
of household heads as a proxy for societal disparity, Gallasso and  Ravallion 
(2000, 23–24) show that targeting was poorer in villages with greater dis-
parity in Bangladesh’s FFE program. 
The social disparity in FFE’s case may explain the program’s anomalous 
nature in terms of being plagued by elite capture and corruption despite 
exhibiting functional accountability and transparency protocols.19 The FFE 
seems to be an example of a case wherein the poor are more amenable to 
upholding social norms and not 
challenging established insti-
tutional structures for fear of 
reprisal from the elite (Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004a, 
60). Governance protocols, while 
functional, may be  useless in 
such cases. This also runs counter 
to the idea that community participation in community-driven initiatives 
increases their leverage and inclination to challenge existing power struc-
tures (Thomass-Slayter 1994). Quite to the contrary, inequality itself may 
become a deterrent for community participation. Moreover, viewing the 
situation from the elites’ perspective, the fear of a challenge to the status 
quo would tend to keep them on guard against any such possibility. This 
explains elite behavior in India’s SGRY.
To be sure, our argument is not designed to be deterministic. Indeed, as 
Nepal’s Churia and India’s NOAPS programs show, even communities with 
high inequality levels can overcome this problem. In the Churia project, 
it was the incidence of elite capture prevalent in prior Nepalese programs 
that led donors to include strong buffers. Quite remarkably, by the end of 
the program, politicians, otherwise considered to be a threat to such initia-
tives, were largely positive about community ownership. At the same time, 
19. The only other program to do so was Bangladesh’s VGD. Given that both were set in the same over-
arching context (their areas of operation overlapped), the following argument made for FFE may also be 
applicable to VGD. (However, our data does not allow us to substantiate this empirically.)
The analysis hints at a relationship 
between social disparity and elite 
capture. While we have been unable 
to formally test this relationship, social 
hierarchies do seem to play a role.
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leakages of grain saw a fifty-fold reduction compared to traditional Nepalese 
Food for Work programs (Meagher, Upadhyaya, and Wilkinson 1999, 
27–28, 35). 
cONcLuSION:  
PuTTINg cOmmuNITy TARgeTINg IN PeRSPecTIve 
The foregoing analysis has highlighted a number of concerns that must 
be taken into account when designing community-targeted interventions. 
Arguably, the single most important finding is that community-targeted in-
terventions have tremendous potential to benefit the poor; the technique is 
undoubtedly preferable to universal programs that are available to the entire 
population. Out of the 30 analyzed programs, only four were regressive. 
However, the generally positive performance should not imply that com-
munity targeting necessarily complements anti-poverty goals of program 
conceivers. In fact, we find an inherent disconnect between community 
behavior and overarching program objectives. The informational advan-
tage—this is the very factor that makes use of communities attractive—acts 
as a double-edged sword. In terms of beneficiary identification, better infor-
mation automatically lends itself to a provision for flexibility. Flexibility in 
beneficiary identification can lead 
to greater efficiency, as was seen 
in cases like Vietnam’s HEPR and 
Bangladesh’s FFE. Even though 
the result is not uniform, this 
implies that communities are 
indeed able to use accumulated 
social capital to acquire and use 
the informational advantage. 
However, social capital and infor-
mational advantage are bound by a tautological relationship. While leading 
to an informational advantage, capital stock is also responsible for pushing 
communities to ignore program criteria in terms of benefits transfer. The 
latter inevitably clashes with poverty reduction goals. Consider that the very 
notion of social capital drives towards strong individual bonds that harness 
Arguably, the single most important 
finding is that community-targeted 
interventions have tremendous poten-
tial to benefit the poor; the technique 
is undoubtedly preferable to universal 
programs that are available to the 
entire population.
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people’s ability for growth and development while improving the prospects 
for community betterment (Grootaert 1998). This automatically implies an 
overriding concern for community norms and interpersonal harmony. In 
terms of benefits transfer then, thin distribution across communities is only 
inevitable. This is especially true in cases where community tensions are 
feared to be a realistic possibility—that is, in communities with low social 
capital. This view also refutes the argument that hard budget constraints 
ensure positive targeting outcomes (Rai 2002). Such constraints actually 
raise the potential for tensions, given that following the transfer criteria 
would leave out many; thin distribution acts as a coping mechanism meant 
to offset the negative externality. 
Political realities make the social capital–poverty reduction trade-off virtually 
irreconcilable. For one, program conceivers, be they governments, donors, or 
NGOs, always remain wary of spurring societal tensions and are thus likely to 
accept diluted poverty reduction impacts as a fait accompli. Moreover, political 
economy concerns are certain to prompt local politicians to favor flexibility in 
disbursement since this portrays them in a favorable light.  
The flexibility-induced conundrum is not the only pitfall associated with 
community-targeted programs. Our analysis reinforces the perception 
that there is a substantial disconnect between the theoretical advantages of 
community participation and their empirical performance. Community 
members tasked to select beneficiaries remain susceptible to collusion as 
long as robust governance-enhancing protocols are missing. Moreover, elite 
capture is evident in a number of cases. Not only that, but as reflected by 
 Bangladesh’s VGD program, communities at times even play into the hands 
of the political elite to achieve benefits. Social accountability and social capi-
tal seem to assist only in cases where strong community-based governance 
mechanisms exist as a societal norm. However, these do not come about 
simply by involving communities in initiatives; they seem to be institution-
alized through long-established community-centric lifestyles.
The above said, perhaps the most encouraging finding from the point 
of view of policy makers is that institutional perversions in community-
targeted programs can be addressed through program-specific design 
elements. The absence of any obvious link between targeting performance 
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and country incomes, regional location, targeting techniques, or program 
types suggests high explanatory power for targeting design elements. While 
a robust targeting design is imperative, there is no evidence that community 
involvement makes implementation of a robust design easier and less costly 
or that communities are better able to oversee proper implementation. In-
deed, community-led design mechanisms should not be seen as substitutes 
for administrative protocols. In fact, we find that successful design elements 
are seldom run solely by communities; rather, they are meant to check com-
munity behavior (apart from flexibility) as much as they are aimed at avoid-
ing any anomalies that communities are unable to question given social and 
institutional realities. Multi-tiered monitoring, which involves communities 
at the lower tier and individuals or teams with no direct stake in the pro-
gram at the second tier, seems preferable. Successful accountability protocols 
were also managed by arrangements that did not involve communities and 
ensured absence of any conflict of interest on the part of the executors. 
Further, transparency in program design and information dissemination 
among communities, as well as in selection and disbursement, is essential. 
However, we do not see simplicity of program design as an imperative. 
Targeted anti-poverty programs are often complex, and complexity is bound 
to increase if an elaborate targeting design is employed, as recommended 
here. Given that, pursuing simplicity in program design as an end in itself 
may in fact be counterproductive to enhancing targeting efficiency. A bet-
ter option is to ensure comprehensive briefing/training of the community 
members involved in implementation of the targeting protocols. By implica-
tion, training of those tasked to brief communities and oversee composition 
of selection committees becomes vital. Moreover, in terms of disbursement, 
transparency can be achieved through public distribution, disbursement 
through honest intermediaries, or through direct transfer mechanisms 
that remove the need for intermediaries altogether. Finally, programs that 
are dynamic in their designs such that they undertake regular updates of 
beneficiary lists and design procedures seem to be better placed. The latter 
is important to preempt the “learning effect” whereby the non-poor and 
intermediaries may extract benefits once they learn how to manipulate the 
targeting process (Lipton and Gaag 1993, 35).
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While our analysis does not lend itself to any “one-size-fits-all” formulation, 
the broad contours of a context that is supportive for community-targeted 
initiatives is discernable. To begin with, conceivers of community-targeted 
interventions should consider lower-than-stipulated per capita benefit 
transfer as a fait accompli and provision for this tendency in their feasibility 
analysis. Moreover, where communities are used, poverty reduction impacts 
should not be strictly dependent on following stipulated criteria in terms of 
poverty proxies. Communities are certain to digress from the criteria and 
any effort to check this tendency would undermine the very rationale for 
employing community targeting, i.e., using local knowledge. Moreover, it 
would inevitably result in community and local political opposition and 
risk spurring societal discord. The cost-benefit analysis of the initiative may 
become unfavorable if the effects of these potential pitfalls are internalized. 
Similarly, community targeting is not recommended for programs where 
aggregation of poverty data is a high priority. 
Community targeting is better attuned to communities where societal ten-
sions and extreme disparity are not a preexisting concern. Moreover, com-
munities can be expected to uphold social norms and thus would exclude 
segments of the community that do not fit their framework. While this does 
not necessarily imply the need for homogeneity, it does suggest that com-
munities bearing excessively disparate power structures or ones inclined to-
wards cultural exclusion based on criteria other than poverty are less suited 
to community targeting. 
Finally, while overarching societal norms that lend themselves to strong 
governance matter, this is not a luxury most developing countries enjoy. 
Therefore, the focus ought to remain on instituting a robust, program-
specific design protocol. Monitoring, transparency, and accountability tend 
to operate in tandem in programs for the most part. Therefore, program 
 designers should think of design elements as an overarching whole and 
seek to integrate these functions rather than treating each one in isolation. 
 Specifically for monitoring, synergies should be developed between the 
community and administrative protocols that are operating together. The 
dictum of “trust but verify” should remain central for those who conceive 
programs. Moreover, while we have not been able to analyze procedures 
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through which selection committees are formulated, it is obvious that the 
person heading the selection process remains vital. Thus, even if the role of 
the elite is inevitable, program managers must retain some say in the choice 
of the “head.” Table 6 lists the ideal conditions for community-targeted 
programs.
Table 6: Ideal conditions for community-Targeted Programs
context Preferred Status
Importance of following stipulated criteria for beneficiary selection Low
Importance of transferring the stipulated per capita benefit to 
beneficiaries
Low
Priority for aggregation of poverty data across multiple communities Low
Preexisting social tensions within the community Low
Level of societal disparity in power structures Not extreme
Tendency towards cultural exclusion of marginalized groups Absent
Robust, program-specific design protocol Present
Societal norms towards accountability and transparency Present
Program managers’ ability to choose “head” of the beneficiary selection 
process from within the community
Present
While the above analysis is still far from providing a comprehensive picture 
of community targeting, it does present a nuanced view on the strengths 
and pitfalls associated with the practice. Since this targeting technique 
continues to enjoy growing support as a means of identifying the poor in 
anti-poverty programs, development experts must play close attention to the 
factors that are most likely to enhance targeting efficiency; this is imperative 
if the global quest to increase the utility of poverty-reduction programs is to 
be realized in the coming years.  
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APPeNDIx 1:  
cROSS-TABuLATIONS OF TARgeTINg DeSIgN eLemeNTS
1 Transparency
Present Absent
Accountability Present 12 0
Absent 0 6
2 Monitoring
Present Absent
Accountability Present 15 0
Absent 2* 5**
*Social Action Program (Child Allowance and Low Income)
** Zakat, IRDP, TIP, SGRY, IAY
3 Monitoring  
Present Absent
Transparency Present 13 0
Absent 2* 5**
* Social Action Program (Child Allowance and Low Income)
** Zakat, IRDP, TIP, SGRY, CSFP
4 Elite Capture
Present Absent
Accountability Present 2* 12
Absent 4 2
* FFE, VGD
5 Monitoring 
Present Absent
Corruption Present 2* 4
Absent 12 1
* VGD, FFE
6 Monitoring  
Present Absent
Elite Capture Present 2* 4
Absent 15 1
* VGD, FFE
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7 Corruption
Present Absent
Accountability Present 2* 12
Absent 4 0
* VGD, FFE
8 Corruption
Present Absent
Transparency Present 2* 11
Absent 3 1
* VGD, FFE
9 Elite Capture
Present Absent
Transparency Present 2* 11
Absent 4 3
* VGD, FFE
10 Elite Capture
Present Absent
Corruption Present 5 0
Absent 0 14
11 Elite Capture
Present Absent
Discretion Present 3* 7
Absent 3 11
* Zakat, TIP, SGRY
12 Corruption
Present Absent
Discretion Present 2 5
Absent 2 10
13 Program Design
Simple Complex
Training/Briefing Present 3 6
Absent 14 5*
* Zakat, TIP, NOAPS, PDM-DKE, CSFP
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